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1- Introduction 
 
 The starting point of this research dates back to my first visit to Athens in 
September 1993. The climate of political effervescence that preceded the Greek general 
elections in those days was quite shocking for somebody used to the way these events 
are usually lived in Spain. This atmosphere was clearly reflected in the public opinion 
polls when Greeks were asked about their level of interest in politics. What I did not 
know then was that I had the privilege of living what was to be the last electoral period 
of that kind for years to come. After 1993 interest in politics started to decline gradually 
and one could say that politics in Greece started to become rather different to what it 
had been during the eighties and early nineties. Why were the Greeks so interested in 
politics until 1993 while the citizens of Spain - another South European new democracy 
– declare themselves to be so indifferent towards politics since the seventies?  Why did 
Greeks stop being interested in politics after that date? In other words, my objectives 
have been to find out why the levels of interest in politics in Spain and Greece were so 
different during the eighties and early nineties and why the evolution of this attitude has 
been so different in the two countries1. 
 Although these two countries have barely ever been subject of a two case 
comparison, several contending explanations have been suggested by the literature 
about political culture of each of the countries or about the political culture of new 
democracies2. The two that have found the biggest echo are the one that focuses on the 
historical legacies of a country, and the one that traces the origins of the peculiar 
political culture of a country to the period of transition to democracy. In the following 
pages I will analyze to what extent each of these explanations is well suited to 
understand both the Greek and the Spanish political culture in what refers to the levels 
and evolution of interest in politics as declared by citizens. Furthermore, I will try to 
argue that more attention should be paid to a third kind of explanation; namely, the one 
that focuses on day to day politics since the period of transition until nowadays. 
 
                                                 
1 In my PhD. research I also addressed a third point that will not be dealt with here. It referred to the 
meaning of “being interested in politics” in the two countries. 
2 The only comparative study between Greece and Spain that I know of is Kaminis’ study of the two 
constitutional processes (1993). For a study of political disaffection in new democracies see Torcal 
(2003). 
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 2- Levels and evolution of interest in politics in Greece and Spain 
  
 With regard to the aggregate levels of interest in politics the question is: Why 
did more than half of the Greek population over 18 declare, during the eighties and 
beginning of the nineties, that they were very or quite interested in politics, while just 
one fourth of the Spanish population shared the same attitude? (graph 1)3. 
 
Graph 1: Levels and evolution of interest in politics in Spain and Greece, 1983-2002 
 
 The high levels of political interest amongst the Greeks and the low levels of the 
Spaniards were not only evident when we compare these two countries but were 
confirmed also when compared to other count ries. Within the European Union, Greece 
has been one of the EU countries with above average level of interest in politics while 
Spain has been amongst those below the average (graph 2). 
 
Graph 2: Interest in politics in Spain and Greece within the EU, 1983-1998 
  
 In terms of the  evolution of trends the question I intend to answer is: Why did  
interest in politics decrease amongst the Greeks after 1993, while it remained quite 
stable among the Spaniards? In Greece the percentage of citizens interested in politics 
has fallen by 20 points between 1993 and 2002 while in Spain it has remained at similar 
levels (graphs 1 and 2). In September 1993 still 52% of the Greeks declared to be 
interested in politics but in June 1994 this proportion had fallen to 40% and in March 
2002 to 34%. On the contrary, in Spain the percentage of citizens interested in politics 
has remained quite stable since the beginning of the eighties until nowadays. In May 
1983 24% of the Spanish population above 18 declared to be interested in politics while 
in March 2002 this percentage was still quite similar, 22%, without having suffered big 
oscillations in between.  The European Social Survey carried out in 2002-2003 (not 
included in the graphs) reveals the following aggregate percentages for Greece and 
Spain respectively: 31% and 21%. 
 
                                                 
3 See annex for the list of surveys used in these analyses. 
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 3- What is important about “interest in politics”? 
 
 When we refer to the political culture of a society this includes several attitudes 
towards politics that refer to different aspects. Some of them refer to whether citizens 
support the democratic regime or not, others have to do with whether citizens are 
satisfied with the way the democratic regime works, others refer to the evaluation of 
specific political outcomes, another group of attitudes has to do with whether politicians 
are perceived as trustworthy and responsive to citizens’ demands. In the case of interest 
in politics, we are in front of an attitude that, first of all, deals with politics in general 
instead of with an aspect of politics in particular, and secondly, it does not necessarily 
imply a positive attitude towards politics but just “interest”. The implications of the 
attitude of being interested in politics have been stressed by both the literature on 
democratic theory, the literature on political participation, as well as by the literature on 
political psychology. 
 Interest in politics is important for the substance of democracy itself. In this 
sense, one may be left wondering what is the meaning of popular sovereignty and 
citizenship if citizens are not interested in politics (Neumann, 1986:9; Hahn, 1993:317; 
Held, 1993:58; Melville, 1993:58). Interest in politics is also relevant as an indicator of 
how much information citizens have about politics and how they manage this 
information. More specifically, interest in politics is said to help citizens process 
complex information. In other words, interest in politics is an indicator of citizens’ 
capacity to make sense of politics (Lodge and Taber, 2000; McGraw, 2000; Kuklinski et 
al, 2001:413). This is why this attitude has a positive influence on the formation, 
stability and coherence of political opinions and on the making of political decisions 
(Lazarsfe ld, Berelson and Gaudet, 1944; Niedermayer, 1990), as well as on the 
expression of political demands through political participation (van Deth, 1990:276; 
McDonough, Barnes and López Pina, 1998:936-7). Thirdly, interest in politics can have 
consequences for the relationship between citizens and their political representatives. 
When people, as a consequence of being interested, have attitudes towards politics, take 
decisions related to political matters, and express these attitudes and judgements, they 
are better able to resist manipulation and to exert control over their political 
representatives (Converse, 1962; Zaller, 1992; Krosnick and Brannon, 1993:965; Mutz, 
Sniderman and Brody, 1996). In other words, it is more likely that a citizenship that is 
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 interested in politics has a positive effect on the accountability of politicians than a 
citizenship that is indifferent towards politics. 
 I do not ignore the fact that, depending on the sources of interest in politics and, 
therefore, depending on the nature and meanings of interest in politics, its implications 
for the aspects just mentioned will vary. In the following lines I will not pay attention to 
the meanings and consequences of interest in politics but just to its sources. However, 
one should be aware of the fact that interest in politics may not be related in exactly the 
same way to other attitudes and behaviours in every single place and at every single 
time and, therefore, may not always have the same implications.   
 
4- Why Greece and Spain? 
 
 The similarities between the histories and many characteristics of Greece and 
Spain make the case of the different levels of political interest all the more puzzling. As 
Professor Malefakis has pointed out, the commonalities among the countries of 
Southern Europe – and, therefore, between Greece and Spain - go beyond the parallel 
processes toward economic, social and cultural modernization since the early fifties 
(1995). These commonalities pre-existed and were strongly reinforced during the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. They can be summarized as follows: “the 
struggle against absolutism and in favour of liberalism and democratization was 
mounted very early in the South European countries but had a much rougher road than 
in the west” of Europe (1995:42).  
 Under a special heading called “Why Greece fits in with the South” Malefakis 
highlighted the undeniable fact that “much of its history links it more to the Balkans 
than to the Italian and Iberian peninsulas”. In this sense, the history of the Ottoman 
Empire provoked a decline in the governmental experience among the elites and the 
lack of autonomy of Greek society. However, he reminds us that, thanks in part to the 
Orthodox Church and its privileged position under the Ottoman Empire, Greeks filled 
the large ecclesiastical bureaucracy which enjoyed unprecedented administrative 
authority. The presence of Venetian outposts until the late eighteenth century and the 
interest in Ancient Greece that developed in the Western world since the Renaissance 
allowed continuous commercial and cultural contact between Greeks and the West. This 
contact was enhanced by the kind of professions that were left open to the non-Muslims, 
and especially the Greeks, under the Ottoman Empire. These were precisely the kind of 
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 activities that implied contact with the West, such as finance, commerce, maritime 
activity, and diplomacy. To all of these facts we can add that one of the main prophets 
of Greek Independence, Rigas Fereos wrote his famous revolutionary hymn in Vienna 
as well as his adaptation of the American and French revolutionary declarations that 
would inspire the war for Greek independence that broke out in 1821. Therefore, some 
important sectors of Greek society were indeed in touch with the ideals of the 
Enlightenment.  
 During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries there were, again according to 
Malefakis, other aspects that were also common to the South European countries: 
precocious but weak social movements, the protagonism of certain actors and 
phenomena (army, church, anticlericalism, opportunistic court circles, little organized 
but frequent labour protests, revolutionary peasants, feelings of national inferiority, 
strong regional consciousness), a semi urban-semi rural society in which capitalism was 
early accepted but often questioned.  But there is one commonality of the South 
European region that is of especial relevance for the object of this study: the presence of 
particularistic politics that have corrupted liberalism, both during the nineteenth and, in 
rather different forms, also during the twentieth century. While in Spain reference has 
been made to these practices in order to explain the distance between Spanish citizens 
and politics (Monzón, 1988:110 and 1992:447), in Greece the argument has been 
exactly the opposite. One of the most common arguments found in the Greek literature 
is that interest in politics has been so high amongst the Greeks due to the fact that 
politics is perceived in a particularistic way4. I will come back to this paradox later on. 
 There is still an additional feature of the recent history of Spain and Greece that 
only these two countries share and that is of especial relevance for the attitudes of 
today’s citizens towards politics: the civil wars that divided both countries during the 
second half of the 1930s in Spain and during the second half of the 1940s in Greece. In 
Spain this traumatic event has often been referred to as the cause of either the automatic 
rejection of political divisions by Spanish citizens, or as the object of political 
discourses, both during the Franco regime and during the transition to democracy, that 
have tried to influence Spanish collective historic memory while, at the same time, 
                                                 
4 The list of authors that appeal to particularistic politics as an explanation – whether partial or total - for 
the high levels of interest in politics amongst the Greeks is very extensive. Some of the most relevant are 
the following: Mouzelis, 1978:145, 1986 and 1995:31-32; Diamandouros, 1983:44-45, 58; Spourdalakis, 
1988:18; Charalambis and Demertzis, 1993; Demertzis, 1997. 
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 trying to keep citizens estranged from politics5. In Greece, however, the literature on 
political interest scarcely refers to the reconstruction of the memory about the civil war, 
nor can we conclude that civil strife automatically results in a gap between citizens and 
politics6. For all these reasons, I think that the comparison between the cases of Spain 
and Greece offers a particularly interesting occasion for the study of political interest 
from a perspective that goes beyond both the influence of particularistic politics and the 
experience of the civil war. 
 The more recent history of the processes of transition to democracy during the 
1970s also allows comparison between these two countries. Finally, the political parties 
or actors that have played an important political role are also quite similar. The main 
protagonists of the transitions to democracy were in both cases conservative forces. In 
spite of their historical relevance communist parties in both cases have remained 
minoritarian ones. At the beginning of the eighties, what had been until then 
minoritarian socialist parties won power in both countries. From then on the 
government has been disputed in both cases between these socialist parties and one 
conservative party. But in both cases we have been able to speak of predominant parties 
when referring to the socialist ones. All these similarities support the comparability 
between these two cases in spite of the inevitable existence of differences between 
them. 
 
5- Contending explanations  
  
 Let’s then, analyze the plausibility of each of the three explanations mentioned 
above: the one based on historical legacies; the one based on processes of political 
change understood as critical junctures; and, third, the one based on day-to-day politics. 
 
                                                 
5 Also in this case, the list of authors that have considered that the civil war has played an important role – 
either directly or indirectly – in the relationship between Spaniards and politics is very broad. Some of 
these are Carr and Fusi, 1979; López Pintor, 1982: 78; Montero and Torcal, 1990 and 2002; Aguilar, 
1996. 
6 Some exceptions are Pollis (1977:13-14) and Pantelidou-Malouta (1987:241). 
 7 
 5.1- The legacies of the past 
  
 The aim of this section is to analyze  the plausibility of the explanations based on 
the history of each country and, more specifically on the history of democracy. We can 
label this a “cultural explanation” and it is found in the literature that deals with the 
political culture of both the Spanish and Greek cases. Cultural explanations assume that 
“the members of different societies are characterized by enduring differences with 
respect to basic political attitudes, values and skills; that is, by different cultures” 
(Inglehart, 1991:35). Here, I come back to the paradox I mentioned before. In the two 
cases, the unstable and incomplete history of democracy has been put forward to explain 
opposite outcomes. In Greece, part of the literature finds the cause for the high levels of 
interest in politics in the manipulation of democratic processes, in the huge presence of 
the state, in the weakness of civil society, and in the consequent particularistic 
perception of politics. However, in some of the Spanish literature these same factors are 
seen as the causes for the low levels of interest in politics in Spain. 
 In general terms we can identify two kinds of cultural explanations, according to 
the degree of change in political attitudes they consider possible. On the one hand, we 
find explanations that can be considered “primordialist” in the sense that they assume  
that these differences are inherent to the different cultures and, therefore, permanent7. 
On the other hand, there are cultural explanations that admit the possibility that attitudes 
change, although very slowly, as a result of the socialization during early adulthood of 
different age cohorts into the predominant political values of the time under different 
political circumstances. According to this kind of cultural approach, political attitudes 
acquired during that period of life tend to remain stable, and changes at the aggregate 
level will only be observed as the oldest cohorts are replaced by the youngest ones 
(Inglehart, 1991:5). Let’s remember that one of the phenomena we want to understand 
is, precisely, the change in political interest that took place in Greece after 1993. We 
also want to know if it was some previous change in attitudes that can account for the 
different levels of interest in politics observed in Spain and Greece during the eighties. 
Therefore, it is only in the second kind of cultural explanations that can offer a possible  
answer to our questions.  
                                                 
7 Laitin has referred to these as the “the first face of culture” (1986). 
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  The idea then is to test the plausibility of the cultural argument based on the 
history of democracy to explain the different levels and evolution of interest in politics 
in Greece and Spain.  This argument usually assumes that the citizens socialized as 
young adults under democratic regimes would show higher levels of interest in politics 
than those socialized under non-democratic regimes. In order to test this idea I have 
identified several periods in the more or less recent history of these countries according 
to the degree of democratic openness and, also to other characteristics of the political 
context such as the degree of mobilization, the degree of repression, or the stability of 
the political regime. Cohorts have been defined as the groups of individuals that were 
between 17 and 22 years old during the different periods. The delimitation of this age 
period attends basically to two criteria, one substantial, and one practical. The 
substantial reason is that between 17 and 22 is the age when individuals in most 
democracies first assume political responsibilities, mainly voting (Beck y Jennings, 
1991; Johnston, 1992:96; Percheron, 1993:175). The practical reason is that, if we 
restrict the socialization period to a few years (six in this case), we minimize the 
possibility that the youngest and the oldest individuals within one same cohort have 
different perceptions of the political events8. The resulting cohorts are five in Spain and 
six in Greece. In Greece, the cohorts are formed by those who were between 17 and 22 
years old during 1) the “national schism” and the Metaxás dictatorship (before 1940), 2) 
occupation and civil war (1941-49), 3) “watched democracy” (1950-66), 4) Junta (1967-
1973), 5) transition and consolidation of democracy (1974-80) and 6) consolidated 
democracy (1982 and after). In Spain, the cohorts are formed by those individuals that 
were between 17 and 22 years old during 1) the civil war and the period that preceded it 
(before 1939), 2) the first period of the Franco regime, characterized by repression and 
economic autarchy (1940-54), 3) the second period of the Franco regime characterized 
by a certain openness (1955-76), 4) the period of transition and consolidation of 
democracy (1977-81), and 5) consolidated democracy (1982 and after) 9. 
                                                 
8 For a discussion about the problems related with the definition of cohorts, cohort socialization and 
cohort analysis, see Martín (2004:174-185). 
9 For a more detailed explanation of the individuals that were included in each of the cohorts in our 
analyses see tables A5 and A6 in the annex. Some clearly distinct periods have been considered as just 
one for practical rather than substantial reasons. This is clearly the case of the oldest cohorts in the two 
countries. If we had distinguished two different cohorts – making more sense of history – we would have 
been left with very few individuals in those cohorts and the statistical analyses would have been 
invalidated. 
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  I will try to analyze whether the levels of interest in politics in each of these 
cohorts are different. For this purpose I have designed a multivariate model that will 
allow us to know to what extent belonging to a specific cohort increases the probability 
of being interested in politics or not. In this model I have controlled the impact of 
cohorts for the effect of two of the most influent factors when we refer to political 
interest: gender and level of education.  By introducing these controls we are able to say 
that, if belonging to a certain cohort increases – or not – the probability of being 
interested in politics, this occurs no matter whether we are speaking of men or of 
women, and no matter whether we are referring to individuals that have achieved a high 
level of education or to individuals that have not had any. I have also controlled the 
effect of the cohorts for the effect of the “life-cycle”10. 
   
Graph 3: Interest in politics in the different cohorts 
 
 After analyzing the effect that belonging to a certain cohort has on being 
interested in politics the cohorts socialized under democratic regimes11 are found to be 
less interested in politics than some of the cohorts socialized under the civil war12 or 
even under a non-democratic regime13. The results of my analysis suggest that wha t 
influences citizens’ level of interest in politics is not the history of democracy, but 
                                                 
10 When analyzing the effect that belonging to a certain cohort may have on the level of interest in politics 
we face a serious methodological “identification problem” (Fienberg y Mason, 1985). Briefly 
explained, this consists in the fact that behind the cohorts lie two other, but coincident, variables: “life 
cycle” and “period”. The three variables – “cohort”, “life cycle” and “period” – are related in the 
following way: age=period-cohort, and this creates a statistical problem of multicolinearity that keeps us 
from being able to identify which of the three is responsible for the effect on political interest.  
Although there is no solution to this puzzle there are two mechanisms that can minimize it somehow and 
that have been applied to this analysis . One is to aggregate several samples of individuals that were 
interviewed at different points in time and treat them as just one sample. This way we break the 
multicolinearity between “cohorts” and “life cycle groups”. For example, in the new sample we will have 
two individuals that are considered as being 30 years old, however, one was born in 1983 and the other in 
2000. These to individuals  will not be placed under the same group in the two variables: they will belong 
to the same age group - that is in the life-cycle period of the “thirties” - but they will belong to different 
“cohorts”. In this case 13 Spanish surveys and 9 Greek surveys have been used to create an aggregates 
file. See Table A4 in the annex.  
However, the problem of multicolinearity does not disappear completely if we keep introducing the three 
variables in the model. This is why I have applied a second mechanism to solve this problem: two 
alternative models . The cohort effect is tested in both but in one of the models it is controlled for the “life-
cycle effect” and in the other it is controlled for the “period effect”. The results shown in the graphs refer 
to the first of these models. 
11 In a coloured version of the graphs these are the orange lines. 
12 The black lines. 
13 The green lines. 
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 rather the history of political mobilization. In Spain the cohorts that show the highest 
levels of interest in politics are the cohort socialized during the second phase of the 
Franco regime (1955-1976), characterized by the gradual revival of civil society, as well 
as the cohort socialized during the transition and consolidation period (1977-1982), also 
characterized by higher levels of mobilization than the rest of the historical periods here 
analyzed14. In Greece, the cohorts that declare to have the highest interest in politics are 
those who were socialized during the previous period to the occupation and during the 
occupation and the civil war. They are followed by the cohorts that were socialized 
during the “semi-democratic” period (1950-1966), and during the Junta (1967-1973). 
Social mobilizations were intense both during the sixties and in 197315. However, 
neither is an explanation based on the history of political mobilization sufficiently 
persuasive.  
 The fact that the youngest cohorts are less interested in politics than the oldest 
ones, can help us understand the gradual decreasing levels of interest in politics in 
Greece as young indifferent cohorts are replacing old interested ones. It can also explain 
the different aggregate levels of interest in politics in Spain and Greece as more living 
Greeks have been socialized under periods in which political mobilization was intense16. 
But, it would lead us to expect to find decreasing aggregate levels of interest in politics 
in Spain as well, and this is something we do not observe in the graphs that describe the 
evolution of aggregate levels of interest in politics in Spain. Nor can it help us 
understand why all the Greek cohorts have a higher level of interest in politics than the 
Spanish ones.  
                                                 
14 For a history of social movements in Spain during the twentieth century see Álvarez Junco (1994). 
About the mobilizations carried out by the workers and the students during the fifties, sixties and 
seventies see Maravall (1978). 
15 For a complete revision of the characteristics of social mobilization in Greece between 1949 and 1967 
see Bernardakis and Mavris (1991). About mobilizations during the Greek transition to democracy see 
Bernardakis (1995).  
16 Notice that until they reach 30 the likelihood of being interested in politics of all the cohorts except the 
youngest one is higher than that of any of the Spanish cohorts. This kind of explanation assumes that 
political attitudes within each cohort are the same in all of the years analyzed. This is why it cannot 
account for the likely decrease of interest in politics in all of the Greek cohorts from 1993 onwards. The 
model could be improved by introducing interaction terms that would tell us whether the relationship of 
interest in politics and age is the same in all cohorts or not. 
18 The most representative works that have put the emphasis on this kind of explanations are Paramio and 
Reverte (1980), Maravall (1982), Del Águila and Montoro (1984), Edles (1990), Morán (1997),  
Benedicto (1997) and Powell (2000:237). 
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  This is why it becomes necessary to analyze the plausibility of the other two 
types of explanation based on critical junctures and on day to day politics. It could be 
that the gradual decrease of interest in politics we find in Greece is not due to 
generational replacement (remember we do not find this in Spain, although we should 
according to the lower levels of interest in politics amongst the youngest cohorts) but to 
a phenomenon that affects all cohorts since the beginning of the nineties. This is a 
hypothesis that needs to be explained under the “day to day politics” approach since it 
could be a rather rapid change in attitudes as a reaction of the performance of political 
actors and institutions. Secondly, it could be that the levels of interest in politics are 
higher in all of the Greek cohorts (at least until 1993), as a result of a change in attitudes 
that took place during the critical juncture of the process of transition and consolidation 
of democracy in this country. Did this process have a more intense mobilizing effect of 
society at large in Greece than in Spain? Let us first examine this explanation based on 
the intense and lasting effect that critical junctures can have on political attitudes. 
 
5.2- The impact of critical junctures: transitions to democracy 
 
 Were the characteristics of the processes of transition and consolidation of 
democracy in each of these two countries responsible for the different levels of interest 
in politics observed during the eighties and the nineties? At first sight it seems a 
reasonable explanation that the decisions taken by the political elites during this period 
about how much to mobilize society could have implied a redefinition of the 
relationship between citizens and politics that marked a rupture with the past and the 
beginning of a diverging trajectory in the political culture of these two countries. 
According to Collier and Collier critical junctures are “periods during which an 
important change takes place, that usually adopts distinctive characteristics in each 
country (or unity of analysis), and of which different legacies are derived” (1991:29). 
Given the relevance of the changes that took place during the processes of transition and 
consolidation of democracy, and their foundational character with respect to the new 
democratic regime, we could think that the kind of relationship between citizens and 
politics that was built during this period could have had a lasting effect on interest in 
politics. This redefinition of the relationship between citizens and politics could have 
implied a relatively rapid change in the political attitudes of all the cohorts, 
independently of their age.  
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  Reference to this argument has been quite frequent in the Spanish case18. The 
consensual nature of the transition to democracy,  ideological moderation and the lack 
of political mobilization by the political elites in Spain during this process have been 
said to have had long lasting effects on citizens’ indifference towards politics. On the 
contrary, in Greece, these processes were characterized by the unilateral decisions taken 
by the Prime Minister, Konstantinos Karamanlís, by the radical discourse of the 
opposition forces – especially by PASOK – and by the much more intense political 
mobilization by the parties of the left 19. But, in order to be able to say that these 
differences were the result of decisions deliberately taken by the political elites, we 
should be able to show that the confining conditions that limited their capacity for 
manoeuvring were similar, and not too strong, in both countries. Otherwise, we would 
not be able to speak of a critical juncture since the constrictions of the past would leave 
too little room as to allow for different possible trajectories. Most of the literature has 
emphasized the greater constrictions in the case of the transition to democracy in Spain 
than in Greece. The transactions between the elites of the outgoing regime and the new 
democratic elites implied a much greater risk on involution in the Spanish case than in 
the case of Greece where the authoritarian regime had collapsed. The attempted coup 
d’état that took place in Spain on the 23 of February 1981 has often been used as the 
demonstration that important threats – especially those coming from the Armed Forces 
– were menacing the democratization process from the very beginning. 
 However, we have several reasons to doubt about the relationship between a 
negotiated transition and low levels of interest in politics. An analysis of the evolution 
of political interest in Spain during the late 1970s does not allow us to conclude that the 
politics of pacts and consensus had a negative impact on interest in politics in Spain 
(graph 4). On the contrary, interest in politics rose during the years 1977 and 1978 when 
the main negotiations between the political elites were taking place.  
 
Graph 4: Interest in politics during the Spanish transition to democracy 
  
 We have a second reason to argue that pacts between the elites were not at the 
roots of political indifference in Spain and this is the fact that there were also pacts in 
Greece. It is true that the constitutional processes was not based on consensus but on the 
                                                 
19 About the types of transition processes that took place in these two countries see, among others, 
O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead (1989) and Linz and Stepan (1996). 
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 unilateral decisions taken by the Primer Minister Karamanlís and that this had as a 
result the negative vote of PASOK when the Constitution was voted in Parliament in 
June 1975. However, there were pacts between government and opposition in other 
matters such as in order to impose the supremacy of civil authorities over military 
ones20, to have a critical stance towards NATO for its passivity during the Cyprus crisis, 
and to narrow the relationship between Greece and the Balkan countries (Agüero, 
1995:391-92). None of these pacts seemed to have the effect of decreasing interest in 
politics amongst the Greeks in later years. 
 Although the relationship between a negotiated transition and lower levels of 
interest in politics are not at all evident, there are stronger grounds for arguing that both 
ideological moderation and political demobilization during the processes of transition 
and consolidation of democracy may have contributed to the different levels of political 
interest observed during the following years in both Spain and Greece. Although pacts 
with political forces from a different ideological sign are usually accompanied by 
ideological moderation, this is not always the case. It was so in the case of the Spanish 
socialist party (PSOE) that soon abandoned its rupturist strategy (after the referendum 
about the Law of Political Reform in December 1976). Its definite ideological 
moderation came in September 1979, after the first two general elections, when it 
abandoned its self-definition as a Marxist party. In the case of the Greek socialist party 
one could say that their discourse was more radical in relative terms. However, this 
radicalism cannot be understood unless it is placed in the context of the unilateral 
decisions taken by the Prime Minister Karamanlís. PASOK did not have time to 
moderate its discourse before the first general elections of November 1974, like PSOE 
did. The fact that these elections were celebrated so early was also one of the reasons 
for the radicalization of the opposition parties of the left – mainly the recently created 
PASOK – for it did not leave them time to organize their electoral campaign. 
Radicalization was also fostered by the exclusive character of the constitutional process 
in which only representatives or the right and centre forces participated. It cannot be 
ignored either, that from 1975 on, PASOK started a process of ideological moderation 
                                                 
20 Psomiades has said that, in spite of its radical discourse, PASOK never questioned the democratic 
regime and abstained from any actions that could have been interpreted as a provocation or a pretext for a 
military intervention (Psomiades, 1982:259). The collaboration between the elites was also evident when 
Karamanlís had to calm down the Armed Forces after PASOK’s victory in the 1981 elections (Psomiades, 
1982:266). Papandreu’s laudatory comments in 1987 about the successful management of the military 
issue by Karamanlís during the transition to democracy point in the same direction (Agüero, 1995:392, 
n.40). 
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 during which it came to abandon the term socialist as part of its self definition in 1977 
Spourdalakis (1988:190)21. 
 But it is true that during the first years PASOK’s discourse was radical in the 
sense that it called for a class struggle in opposition to the government ’s appeal to 
national unity; it defended an independent and “thirdworldist” strategy as opposed to 
what it considered a government too dependent on the United States’ imperialism; and it 
called for socialist self-management as opposed to what it saw as the reconstruction of a 
parliamentarian oligarchy (Kaftantzoglou, 1979:50, 54-55). During the first years 
PASOK’s discourse was more radical than the Communists’ (Kaftantzoglou, 1979; 
Spoudalakis, 1988:78; Karakatsanis, 2001:10)22 and in relation to Greece’s integration 
in the European Community it kept a critical stance until 1985 (Verney, 1993:139). This 
is why we could expect a higher interest in politics amongst the Greeks as a result of the 
mobilizing capacity of the radical discourse of PASOK dur ing this crucial period of 
political change. 
  The differences between the aspects of the transition and consolidation 
processes in Greece and Spain become even clearer when we focus on party 
mobilization. The organizational mobilization carried out by PASOK – and the rest of 
the parties as a reaction to its strategy – was considerably higher than that carried out by 
PSOE (and the rest of the Spanish parties). In Spain the intense mobilizations that had 
characterized the political scene during the second half of 1976 and the first half of 
1977 entered a decline after the legalization of the Communist Party in April 1977 and, 
especially after the first general elections that took place in June that year. In Greece the 
trend followed by social mobilization was the opposite.  It was characterized by a 
spontaneous and not structured character until 1977 but, starting the summer of 1977 
social mobilization became part of the successful electoral strategy of PASOK. This 
included both the development of a party organization all over the country and the 
collaboration or cooptation of the social movements23. This process culminated in the 
electoral campaign of 1981. Spourdalakis has said that the mobilizational strategy of 
PASOK implied, not only a redefinition of the electoral rules but of Greek politics in 
                                                 
21 About the gradual moderation of PASOK’s discourse see Lyrintzis  (1984:111); Elephantis (1981:116, 
129), Spourdalakis (1988) and Karakatsanis (2001:127 ff.) 
22 Although one could also find a parallelism in this respect between PASOK and PSOE. For example, 
PSOE accepted the monarchy only after PCE did. 
23 About the development of both these processes see Elephantis  (1981); Fakiolas (1987); Spourdalakis 
(1988) and Bernardakis  (1995). 
 15 
 general (1988:209). The comparison between the number of party members between 
1974 and 1982 speaks for itself and reinforces the idea that the intense party 
mobilization that took place in Greece during these years could be at the basis of the 
different levels of interest in politics during the eighties and beginning of the nineties 
(table 1). 
 
Table 1: Evolution of the number of party members during the transition and consolidation of 
democracy in Spain and Greece24 
 
PSOE25 AP/ CD26 PCE27  PASOK28 ND29 KKE KKE-es 
3.000  15.000 1974     
   1975 8.000    
6.000   1976  20.000   
51.552  191.607 1977 27.000 20.000   
  156.184 1978  100.000   
101.082 5.000  1979 65.000 150.000   
   1980 75.000    
99.408 20.000 132.069 1981 110.000    
112.591 85.412  1982     
Number of party members. There are no data for KKE and KKE-es for this period. 
Several sources.  
 
 These differences could be attributed to the lower risk of involution in the Greek 
than in the Spanish process of transition and consolidation of democracy. If this were so 
we would not be able to say that they were part of the choices made by the political 
elites during a critical juncture that were responsible for the different trajectories 
followed in each of the countries thereafter. However, there are several arguments that 
support the idea that the confining conditions were similar in both countries and, 
therefore, that the different mobilizational strategies were the product of elite choice30. 
                                                 
24 Due to the nature of these data, it is necessary not to interpret them literally. In order to be able to 
compare the numbers between the two countries it will be useful to take into account that the population 
size in Spain and Greece, respectively, was 35.3 and 9 millions in 1974 and 37.9 and 9.8 millions in 1982 
(European Economy, 2001:114). 
25 The data for PSOE come from Gangas (1995:144) and Colomé (1998:272). Other sources provide 
slightly different numbers such as, for example, 2.548 in 1974 (Míguez, 1990:240 cit. Powell, 2002:67), 
9.000 in 1976 (Satrústegui, 1992:39) or 150.000 in 1979 (Colomé, 1998:272). 
26 Most of the data for PP come from López Nieto (1998:257) who refers to them as oficial party data.  
27 Ramiro (2003:80). The data for PCE in 1974 come from Míguez (1990:240 cit. Powell, 2002:67). 
28 Spourdalakis (1998:400). According to Lyrintzis in 1980 the number was 60.000 (1984:111). 
29 The data for ND come from Kalyvas (1998:93), Pappas (1999:177) and Morlino (1998:179,204). 
30 Not only was the risk of involution as important in Greece as it was in Spain, but the Spanish elites not 
always perceived the risk in their country as being as important as most of the literature has emphasized 
later one. After the first general elections of June 1977 the big, most risky, decisions had been taken and 
the overall perception was that the worst was already gone. This perception was even clearer when the 
politics of consensus was broken during the 1979 electoral campaign (Malefakis, 1982:226; Agüero, 
1995:391-392). 
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 The two most revealing ones are the fact that the rupture with the non-democratic 
regime was not as clear in Greece as has often been assumed and the fact that the 
Armed Forces posed a threat during the Greek process of political change to a similar 
extent as they did in Spain31. The authoritarian regime in Greece collapsed but this did 
not necessarily imply a rupture since there was no actor that could develop it. The one 
who finally did, Konstantinos Karamanlís, was called to lead the process by the 
President of the outgoing regime, General Gizikis, and the links with the outgoing 
regime were noticeable since, for example, three of the ministers – Vitsio, Gikas and 
Averof – had been related to the Junta (Kaftantzoglou, 1979:59-61). Therefore, collapse 
does not necessarily mean rupture. Secondly, the fact that the threat of a coup d’état 
only materialized itself in the case of Spain does not mean that this threat was not as 
present in Greece. In fact, several conspiracies were discovered and one could say that 
the risk of a military coup did not disappear until 1983 (Karakatsanis, 2001:154-156). 
 But, once more, an explanation based on the different mobilizational strategies 
during the critical process of political change is not completely satisfactory when it 
comes to trying to understand the levels and evolution of political interest in Spain and 
Greece during the eighties and the nineties. Critical junctures are supposed to have a 
lasting effect that will be resistant to change until a new critical juncture arises. No 
political process during the democratic period can be compared to the transition from a 
non-democratic regime to a democratic one or to the period of consolidation of the new 
democratic regime. Why, then, has interest in politics decreased amongst the Greeks 
after 1993? This is why I think it necessary to explore a more dynamic explanation 
based on day-to-day politics.  
 
                                                 
31 For other arguments that support the idea that the risk of involution was similar in the two countries see 
Martín (2004:289-302). 
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 5.3- Day to day politics 
  
 The main argument regarding day to day politics is that the discourse of political 
parties is a changing one, and that it has a “running” effect on citizens’ interest in 
politics. Both ideology and perception of differences between the discourses of the main 
parties can provoke changes in citizens’ interest in politics. The analysis I have carried 
out reveals that a leftist ideology can foster interest in politics and that a centre ideology 
may have the opposite effect. A right-wing ideology would be somewhere in between. 
Also, the more differences citizens perceive between parties – whether ideological or 
otherwise– the more interested they will be in politics. One third factor that I show to 
have an effect on the level of interest in politics is party mobilization during periods of 
rutinary politics. This is shown by the fact that the voters of some parties are more 
interested in politics than others and that their different levels of interest have nothing to 
do with the parties’ or the citizens’ ideology, nor with the cohort they belong to, their 
age, their gender or their level of education (table 2)32.  
                                                 
32 The analysis is a binomial logistic regression in which the variables “ideology”, “party preference / 
vote intention” and “polarization / perception of differences between the political parties” have been 
added to those variables already included in the model that was designed to test the effect that belonging 
to a certain cohort had on being more or less interested in politics. 
  
Tabla 2.1. Political explanations of interest in politics in Spain and Greece controlling for the LIFE-CYCLE  EFFECT – Logistic regression models 
  SPAIN  GREECE 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Gender 0,61* 0,60* 0,56*  0,58* 0,57* -- 
Level of education 0,83* 0,81* 0,75*  0,43* 0,48* -- 
Sociodemographic 
variables 
 0,00 0,00 0,00  -0,02* -0,03* -- 
Cohort 1:  
Before end of civil war 0,07 0,15 0,39 
Cohort 1:  
Before occupation 
1,49* 2,19* -- 
Cohort 2:   
First Franco period 0,32* 0,33* 0,34* 
Cohort 2:  
Occupation and civil war 1,47* 1,94* 
-- 
Cohort 3:  
Opening of Franco regime 0,64* 0,57* 0,57* 
Cohort 3:  
Semi-democracy 1,31* 1,61* -- 
Cohort 4:  
Transition and consolid. 0,35* 0,26* 0,23* 
Cohort 4:  
Junta 0,95* 1,07* -- 
Cohorts 
    
Cohort 5:  
Transition and consolid. 0,66* 0,68* 
-- 
Extreme left 1,40* 1,22* 1,06*  1,13* 1,07* -- 
Left 0,81* 0,74* 0,55*  0,78* 0,70* -- 
Right 0,59* 0,38* 0,29*  0,25* 0,26* -- 
Ideology 
Extreme right 0,72* 0,51* 0,61*  0,35* 0,38* -- 
PSOE -- 0,50* 0,45* PASOK -- 0,78* -- 
PP -- 0,74* 0,64* ND -- 0,51* -- 
IU -- 0,92* 0,87* KKE -- 0,79* -- 
Another party    KKE-es -- 0,28 -- 
Party preferences 
(vote intention) 
All parties are the same -- 0,95* 0,71* Another party -- 0,05 -- 
Polarization Gender -- -- -0,96*  -- -- -- 
 Constant -2,76* -2,98* -2,29*  -0,95* -1,00* -- 
 Nagelkerke R2  0,18 0,20 0,24  0,12 0,15 -- 
 N 62.745 62.745 18.568 N 15.653 15.653 -- 
Reference category of cohorts “Cohort socialized during the consolidated democracy (80s and 90s)”. 
Reference category of  ideology “Centre”. 
Reference category of party preference “Did not vote / blank / not valid”. 
* Significant p<0,05. 
Note: In Greece the model that intends to measure the impact of polarization controlling for age presents multicollineality problems as measured by the tolerance statistic and 
by the Variante Inflation Factor (VIF). 
  
Table 2.2. Political explanations of interest in politics in Spain and Greece controlling for the PERIOD EFFECT – Logistic regression models 
  SPAIN  GREECE 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Gender 0,61* 0,60* 0,55*  0,59* 0,59* 0,45* Socio-demographic 
variables Level of education 0,83* 0,81* 0,75*  0,47* 0,51* 0,46* 
 -- -- -- Cohort 1:  
Before occupation 
0,45* 0,34* 0,55* 
Cohort 1:  
Before end of civil war 
0,10 -0,01 0,31* 
Cohort 2:  
Occupation and civil war 
0,65* 0,51* 0,65* 
Cohort 2:   
First Franco period 0,34* 0,21* 0,28* 
Cohort 3:  
Semi-democrac y 0,74* 0,61* 0,70* 
Cohort 3:  
Opening of Franco regime 0,66* 0,52* 0,54* 
Cohort 4:  
Junta 0,64* 0,51* 0,55* 
Cohorts 
Cohort 4:  
Transition and consolid. 
0,36* 0,24* 0,22* 
Cohort 5:  
Transition and consolid. 
0,43* 0,33* 0,18 
Extreme left 1,41* 1,23* 1,06*  1,14* 1,10* 0,98* 
Left 0,82* 0,75* 0,55*  0,81* 0,72* 0,59* 
Right 0,59* 0,39* 0,30*  0,22* 0,26* 0,06 
Ideology 
Extreme right 0,72* 0,51* 0,61*  0,32* 0,38* 0,01 
PSOE -- 0,49* 0,45* PASOK -- 0,76* 0,48* 
PP -- 0,73* 0,62* ND -- 0,46* 0,36* 
IU -- 0,92* 0,87* KKE -- 0,67* 0,39 
 -- -- -- KKE-es -- 0,42* 0,62 
Party preferences 
(vote intention) 
Another party -- 0,95* 0,72* Another party -- 0,09 -0,19 
Polarization All parties are the same -- -- -0,98*  -- -- -0,96* 
(Continued)
  
(Continuation of Table 2.2) 
  SPAIN GREECE 
  Model 1 Model 1 Model 1 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Period effect Year 1983 -0,11 -0,06 -- 0,11 0,64* -- 
 Year 1984 -0,05 0,00 -- -- -- -- 
 Year 1985 -0,03 0,04 -0,07 0,68* 0,76* -0,16 
 Year 1986 0,15* 0,22* -- -- -- -- 
 Year 1988 -0,04 0,00 -0,01 0,61* 0,71* -- 
 Year 1989 -0,02 0,03 -0,11 0,87* 0,93* -- 
 Year 1990 -0,08 -0,10 -0,24* 0,70* 0,74* -- 
 Year 1991 -0,10 -0,07 -0,16 -- -- -- 
 Year 1992 -0,11 -0,05 -- -- -- -- 
 Year 1993 0,01 0,06 -- 0,55* 0,56* -- 
 Year 1994 0,16* 0,15* -- -- -- -- 
 Year 1995 -- -- -- -0,05 0,00 -- 
 Year 1996 0,06 0,02 -0,05 0,07 0,09 -- 
 Constant -2,77 -3,08 -2,22 -- -- -- 
 Nagelkerke R2  0,18 0,20 0,24 0,15 0,16 0,18 
 N 62.832 62.832 18.588 15.801 15.801 3.050 
Reference category of cohorts  “Cohort socialized during the consolidated democracy (80s and 90s)”. 
Reference category of  ideology “Centre”. 
Reference category of period effect “Year 2000” (“ Year 1990” in the model for Greece in which the polarization variable is introduced). 
Reference category of party preference “Did not vote / blank / not valid”. 
* Significant p<0,05. 
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  It is the specific mobilizing strategies used by each of the parties that seem to 
play the crucial role. Overall, during the period 1983-2000 the most successful party 
strategies in promoting interest in politics amongst their voters have proven to be the 
following. In the case of Greece, both the Communist (KKE) and the Socialist Party 
(PASOK) have mobilized the political interest of their voters to a similar extent and they 
have been more successful in doing so than the Greek Popular Party (Nea Dimocratía). 
In Spain the nationalist parties and Izquierda Unida (United Left) have mobilized the 
political interest of their voters to a greater extent than the main two parties. However, 
the Partido Popular (Popular Party) has been more successful in this sense than the 
Socialist Party. 
 The analysis of the evolution of the relationship between these three political 
variables – ideology, polarization and party mobilization – through bivariate analysis  
together with the narrative of events prove illuminating33. First of all, they reveal that 
the evolution of interest in politics in Spain has been much more dynamic than what the 
analysis of the aggregate data allows us see. The relationship between political interest, 
on the one hand, and ideology or party preferences, on the other, has proven to be a 
changing one in the two countries.  As the political discourse of the main parties has 
become more moderate and moved closer to the centre, the proportion of citizens that 
place themselves near the centre of the ideological spectrum has also increased. As we 
saw in the multivariate analysis, centrist ideology is the one that appears least likely to 
foster interest in politics. In other cases the discourse of political parties has become 
similar with respect to non- ideological issues, or less confrontational, or less credible. 
This has given rise to a different kind of depolarization and to an increase in the 
proportion of citizens sharing the impression that “all parties are alike”. This perception 
also leads to a decrease in interest in politics. 
                                                 
33 Neither the bivariate analyses, nor the narrative of events are included here. For more details see Martín 
(2004:340-401). In any case, this is not the ideal method for this purpose, but there were important data 
constraints on following a multivariate strategy which would have been the ideal way to carry out this 
analysis. In order to be able to control the effect of the cohorts for the effect of age without facing 
multicolinearity problems I had to carry out a pooled logistic regression. This method does not allow us to 
obtain a dynamic view of the relationships analyzed. If I had carried out one logistic regression for each 
of the years I would have confronted two problems. First of all, the different sampling methods used by 
the different institutes would not have allowed me to compare the non-standardized coefficients of each 
variable across surveys. A second problem would have been that of multicolinearity when trying to 
control for both the effect of cohorts and the effect of age. A more detailed analysis of the dynamics of 
party mobilization and interest in politics would require a more complex analysis and, probably, the 
introduction of interaction terms in the statistical model I have used. This is one of the possible lines of 
research for the future. 
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  Each of these processes of moderation and depolarization has followed a 
rhythm of its own in each of the two countries. This is what explains the different 
evolution of political interest in Spain and Greece. 
 
Graph 5: Interest in politics and party mobilization 
 
 As we can see in graph 5, in the case of Greece radical discourse, polarization 
and mobilization were intense during the eighties, especially on the part of the 
Communist and the Socialist parties. The process of moderation, depolarization, and 
demobilization followed by the two main parties increased from 1993 onwards and it 
found a reflection in the decreasing interest in politics of their voters. Only the 
Communist Party, after 1991, has been able to maintain the levels of political interest 
amongst its voters through the radicalization of its discourse and its appeal to 
mobilization. Therefore, a leftist polarizing discourse and party mobilization fostered 
interest in politics in Greece during the eighties and at the beginning of the nineties34.  
 In Spain the Socialist party adopted a more moderate ideological discourse and 
the relationship between the two main parties was not, in general, a polarized one, at 
least until 1993. However, interest in politics has proven to be sensitive to changes in 
the mobilizing strategies followed by parties. As you can see in the second graph, this 
was the case during the mid-1980s when the left mobilized its voters against the 
Spanish membership of NATO. But this has also been the case of the organizational 
changes produced in the Popular Party after its re-foundation during the early nineties. 
The emphasis of the Spanish Popular Party on organizational mobilization has been able 
to counter the demobilizing effects of its process of moderation and towards a centre-
like discourse. At the aggregate level it has also been able to counter the diminishing 
interest in politics amongst the voters of Izquierda Unida35.  
 
                                                 
34 However, because these factors were combined with populist elements - that is, with the excessive 
simplification of reality and of political antagonisms – they led to a formalistic kind of political interest 
(see Martín, 2004). 
35 In this case it has not been due to moderation but to the distance between voter’s ideological 
preferences and the party’s. In the case of IU the party has followed a more radical discourse than that of 
its voters. 
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 6- Concluding remarks 
  
 I have tried to argue that, contrary to what much of the literature has insistently 
argued, citizens’ interest in politics is not so resistant to change. The levels and changes 
observed in citizens’ interest in politics depend on the discursive, ideological and 
mobilizing strategies that political parties decide to implement as part of the normal 
development of political life. In other words, day-to-day party politics has an influence 
on the level of interest that citizens have in politics and its aggregate levels are not only 
dependent on history or culture. 
 The main conclusion can therefore be summed up as follows: only the changes 
observed in the degree of polarization, ideology and mobilization of political parties 
during day-to-day politics can help us understand the evolution and meaning of interest 
in politics in Spain and Greece during the democratic period. The history of each 
country and theories based on socialization during young adulthood can explain why 
more Greeks are interested in politics. More Greek than Spanish cohorts have been 
socialized under periods of intense political mobilization. But they do not explain the 
evolution of interest in politics. Why does interest not decline in Spain in spite of the 
fact that younger cohorts are less interested in politics? The visions and decisions of the 
political elites during the critical juncture of transition and consolidation of democracy 
offer and explanation for the higher levels of interest found in all the Greek cohorts 
when compared to the Spanish ones. The degree of party mobilization during the 
consolidation of democracy was more intense than its equivalent in Spain. But, again, it 
does not offer an explanation for its decline in Greece after 1993. Like I say, only the 
evolution of the three political variables mentioned during the eighties and nineties can 
give us a clue about the changes in political interest occurred both in Greece and in 
Spain.  
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 Graph 1: Levels and evolution of interest in politics in Spain and Greece, 1983-2002 
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
ma
y-8
3
ma
y-8
4
ma
y-8
5
ma
y-8
6
ma
y-8
7
ma
y-8
8
ma
y-8
9
ma
y-9
0
ma
y-9
1
ma
y-9
2
ma
y-9
3
ma
y-9
4
ma
y-9
5
ma
y-9
6
ma
y-9
7
ma
y-9
8
ma
y-9
9
ma
y-0
0
ma
y-0
1
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
mar-83
mar-84
mar-85
mar-86
mar-87
mar-88
mar-89
mar-90
mar-91
mar-92
mar-93
mar-94
mar-95
mar-96
mar-97
mar-98
mar-99
mar-00
mar-01
mar-02
Spain Greece
 30 
 
 
 
 
 
Countries BELOW EU average 1983-1998
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
mar-
83
o c t -
88
mar-
8 9
jun-
89
o c t -
89
mar-
90
o c t -
90
jun-
9 4
dic-
94
abr-
98
B E L G I U M
SPAIN
F R A N C E
I R E L A N D
ITALY
P O R T U G A L
A U S T R I A
Average UE
Countries ABOVE EU average 1983-1998
0
10
2 0
3 0
4 0
5 0
6 0
7 0
8 0
9 0
100
mar-
83
o c t -
88
mar-
89
jun-
89
o c t -
89
mar-
90
o c t -
90
jun-
94
dic-
94
abr-
98
D E N M A R K
W . G E R M A N Y
GREECE
L U X E M B U R G
NETHERLANDS
E . G E R M A N Y
UN.  KINGDOM
F I N L A N D
S W E D E N
Average UE
Graph 2: Interest in politics in Spain and Greece within the EU, 1983-1998 
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(probabilities controlled for age, gender and level of education) 
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Graph 4: Interest in politics during the final phase of the Franco regime and the 
Spanish transition to democracy38 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
38 Two different graphs are shown because the wording of the questions differed in the surveys included 
in each of them. In the first graph percentages are for those citizens who said they were “very” and 
“quite” interested in politics while in the second they are for citizens who said they were “very” and “so-
so” (regular) interested in politics. 
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Graph 5: Interest in politics and party mobilization 
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 ANNEX 
 
 
 
 
Table A.1. Time series of “interest in politics” – Greece (1985-2002) 
 
 
GREECE 
Institute Year Month Sample size 
EKKE (Four Nation Study)* 1985 May 1.998 
EKKE 1988 May-June 3.000 
EKKE* 1989 A June 1.996 
EKKE* 1989 B October 1.200 
EKKE* 1990 April 1.200 
Opinion* 1993 September 2.009 
V-PRC (PASOK) 1995 June 3.000 
MRB (Mega) 1995 -- 1.500 
EKKE (CNEP)**39 1996 September-October 1.196 
Opinion (Elefcerotipía) 1999 October 1.614 
MRB (Mega)* 2000 February 2.000 
MRB (Mega)* 2000 March 2.000 
Opinion (Elefcerotipía)* 2000 October 1.607 
Opinion (Elefcerotipía) 2001 November 1.600 
Opinion (Elefcerotipía) 2002 -- 1.000 
 
 
* Pre-electoral survey 
** Pre and post-electoral survey 
In parenthesis is the name of the project (1985 y 1996) or of the institution that ordered the study. 
-- Unknown. 
 
                                                 
39 The pre-electoral survey was carried out between 7-13 September and ended befote the televised 
debate between Simitis and Evert, according to the CNEP rules. The post-electoral survey took place 
between 1-10 October, the sample size was 996. 
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 Table A.2. Time series of “interest in politics” CIS – Wording “quite interested” (1983-2002) 
 
 
SPAIN  Series nb. 200 “Quite” 
Institute Study number Year Month Sample size 
CIS 1355 1983 May 3.368 
CIS 1380 1983 November 11.077 
CIS 1390 1984 January 2.948 
CIS 1430 1984 October 2.505 
CIS 1453 1985 March 2.493 
CIS 1461 1985 May 2.498 
CIS 1471 1985 July 2.479 
CIS 1517 1986 February 2.454 
CIS 1526 1986 April 25.667 
CIS 1529 1986 May 4.429 
CIS 1559 1986 November 2.493 
CIS 1567 1986 December 2.488 
CIS 1740 1988 April 2.496 
CIS 1788 1989 January 3.356 
CIS 1789 1989 February 27.287 
CIS 1803 1989 April 2.499 
CIS 1808 1989 May 3.072 
CIS 1838 1989 September 2.471 
CIS 1870 1990 April 2.895 
CIS 1871 1990 May 2.876 
CIS 1970 1991 June 2.471 
CIS 2013 1992 June 2.495 
CIS 2055 1993 April 2.500 
CIS 2062 1993 June 2.500 
CIS 2083 1994 February 2.499 
CIS 2212 1996 April 2.499 
CIS 2382 / 2384 2000 May 24.040 
CIS 2450 2002 November 4.252 
 
 
 
Table A.3. Eurobarometers containing the question about “interest in politics” (1983-1998) 
 
 
Study number Year Month Sample size 
   Greece Spain 
EB 19 * 1983 Mar-Apr 1.000 -- 
EB 30 1988 Oct-Nov 1.000 1.013 
EB 31 1989 Mar-Apr 1.000 1.001 
EB 31A 1989 Jun-Jul 1.000 1.003 
EB 32 1989 Oct-Nov 1.007 992 
EB 33 1990 Mar-Apr 1.003 1.004 
EB 34 1990 Oct-Nov 1.008 1.001 
EB 41.1 1994 Jun-Jul 1.002 1.000 
EB 42 1994 Dec 1.002 1.006 
EB 49 1998 Apr-May 1.013 1.000 
 
* Spain was not yet an EC member.  
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 Table A.4. Surveys and variables included in the “aggregated file”. 
 
 
 Gender 
Level of 
education 
Age / 
Cohorts Ideology 
Vote 
intention 
All 
parties 
are alike 
Spanish surveys       
CIS 1380 – November 1983  X X X X X  
CIS 1390 – January 1984 X X X X X  
CIS 1461 - May 1985 X X X X X X 
CIS 1517 – February 1986 X X X X X  
CIS 1740 – April  1988 X X X X X X 
CIS 1788 – January 1989 X X X X X X 
CIS 1870 – April  1990 X X X X X X 
CIS 1970 – June 1991 X X X X X X 
CIS 2013 – June 1992 X X X X X  
CIS 2055 – April  1993 X X X X X  
CIS 2083 – February 1994 X X X X X  
CIS 2212 -  April  1996 X X X X X X 
CIS 2382 / 84 – May 2000 X X X X X X 
Greek surveys       
Eurobarometer 19 - 1983 X X X X X  
EKKE – May 1985 X X X X X X 
EKKE – May/June 1988 X X X X X  
EKKE – October 1989 X X X X X  
EKKE – April 1990 X X X X X X 
Opinion – September 1993 X X X X X  
VPRC – June 1995 X X X X X  
EKKE – September 1996 X X X X X  
Opinion - 2000 X X X X X  
 
Note: The syntax file with which I have standardized the variables of the different surveys that form this 
file can be made available by the author.  
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 Table A.5. Spanish surveys: Cohorts from youngest to oldest as used in the statistical analysis 
 DEMOCRACY DICTATORSHIP  
 80s and 90s Trans. and cons. Openning of Franco regime Repression and autarchy Civil war and before 
1979  18-19 20-41 42-56 57-98 
1980  18-20 21-42 43-57 58-98 
1982  18-22 23-44 45-59 60-98 
1983 18 19-23 24-45 46-60 61-98 
1984 18-19 20-24 25-46 47-61 62-98 
1985 18-20 21-25 26-47 48-62 63-98 
1986 18-21 22-26 27-48 49-63 64-98 
1989 18-24 25-29 30-51 52-66 67-98 
1990 18-25 26-30 31-52 53-67 68-98 
1991 18-26 27-31 32-53 54-68 69-98 
1993 18-28 29-33 34-55 56-70 71-98 
1994 18-29 30-34 35-56 57-71 72-98 
1996 18-31 32-36 37-58 59-73 74-98 
1998 18-33 34-38 39-60 61-75 76-98 
2000 18-35 36-40 41-62 63-77 78-98 
2002 18-37 38-42 43-64 65-79 80-98 
 
Table A.6. Greek surveys: Cohorts from youngest to oldest as used in the statistical analysis 
 DEMOCRACY DICTATORSHIP SEMI-DEM.   
 80s and 90s Trans. and cons. Junta Semi-dem Occup. and civil war  “Schism” and Metaxas  
1983 18-19 20-25 26-34 35-50 51-59 60-98 
1985 18-21 22-27 28-36 37-52 53-61 62-98 
1988 18-24 25-30 31-39 40-55 56-64 65-98 
1989 18-25 26-31 32-40 41-56 57-65 66-98 
1990 18-26 27-32 33-41 42-57 58-66 67-98 
1993 18-29 30-35 36-44 45-60 61-69 70-98 
1995 18-31 32-37 38-46 47-62 63-71 72-98 
1996 18-32 33-38 39-47 48-63 64-72 73-98 
2000 18-36 37-42 43-51 52-67 68-76 77-98 
2001 18-37 38-43 44-52 53-68 69-77 78-98 
2002 18-38 39-44 45-53 54-69 70-78 79-98 
 
